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Abstract: The paper provides evidence on what affects at the margin the cost and
availability of bank credit for firms in Argentina. We study in particular how banks use
different pieces of private and public information to screen firms and overcome informational
asymmetries in the credit market. Some private information is transferable, like balance
sheet data. Private information generated in relationships is not. To capture the closeness of
bank relationships, we resort to the concentration of bank credit and the number of credit
lines in a bank. We also consider public information available in the Central de Deudores.
The cost of credit is measured using overdrafts, the most expensive line of credit, at
the bank that charges the highest rate for overdrafts. We find that the cost of credit is smaller
for a firm with a close relationship to the marginal bank. Firms with large assets, a high
sales/assets ratio, and a low debt/assets ratio pay a lower interest rate at the margin. A good
credit history (no debt arrears and no bounced checks) and collateral also reduce the
marginal interest rate.
The availability of credit is measured by unused credit lines as a proportion of total
liabilities with the main bank. The availability of credit depends positively on a close
relationship with the main bank. Large assets, a high return over assets, a high sales/assets
ratio, a low debt/assets ratio, a good credit history, and collateral lead to higher credit
availability. Our measure of unused credit lines is less ambiguous than traditional measures
like leverage, which may indicate financial distress rather than availability of credit.
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21. Introduction
This paper tries to evaluate the determinants of the variation in the cost and availability of
bank credit across firms in Argentina. This issue has a high profile because many firms
complain loudly about bank credit being too expensive. There is also widespread complaint
about limited access to bank credit. These same complaints are voiced in many places, but
in Argentina this happens against the backdrop of underdeveloped financial markets, not
only compared to OECD countries, but also to emerging countries like Chile (Caballero,
2000). Stock market capitalization is low, and so is financial intermediation in terms of the
ratio of M3 to GDP, or of loans to the private sector to GDP. To complete this picture, in the
last two years high country risk, and crowding out by the public sector, have made the
problem of credit constraints particularly acute for firms in Argentina.
To study credit constraints, a cross-section for October 2000 is built with data
collected by the Banco Central de la República Argentina (BCRA) from financial institutions.
All financial institutions supervised by the central bank are referred to as “banks” for short.
Bank credit is particularly relevant for firms in Argentina. Mayer (1994) defines as a banking
economy a country with a small proportion of quoted firms, and as a market economy a
country with a high percentage of quoted firms. Argentina can clearly be classified as a
banking economy, because less than a hundred firms are quoted in the stock exchange,
whereas the financial system grants credit to over a hundred thousand legally incorporated
firms.
The theoretical literature on credit constraints emphasizes the importance of
information problems. Our goal is to see how different bits and pieces of information affect
the cost and access to credit. In Argentina, the changes in this front have been substantial.
There was practically no credit market in 1990. Banks had imploded, and the little assets
they had were concentrated in government securities. After the Convertibility plan was
launched in 1991 with the aim of achieving price stability, lending to firms had to start almost
from scratch. Since it takes time to generate a track record to evaluate firms, it seems no
wonder that firms should initially have been subject to large individual credit constraints.
Besides this internal information of banks, which can be termed relationships, private credit
bureaus and public credit registers developed during the 90’s, pooling part of this internal
information.
In the empirical literature there is no straightforward procedure to detect the presence
of credit constraints. Usually, the presence of credit constraints is detected indirectly, e.g. by
the excess sensibility of investment to liquidity (cf. Schiantarelli, 1996). This paper proposes
a different approach to analyze credit constraints. This approach is closest in spirit to
Petersen and Rajan (1994), who try to detect the presence of credit constraints by the
3degree that firms resort to trade credit to finance their operations. We propose to look
instead at the lack of unused credit lines as an indicator of credit constrained firms. Our
study can throw light on the intensive credit margin, which has to do with how much credit is
available to a firm that already operates with the financial system. Since we do not have data
on firms that have not received any credit from the financial system, the paper cannot
explain extensive credit margins that determine whether a firm is cut off from bank loans or
not.
Our main findings are as follows. The availability of credit depends positively on close
relationships with a bank. Good characteristics of a firm (large assets, a high return over
assets, a high sales/assets ratio, and a low debt/assets ratio), a good credit history (normal
credit situation and no bounced checks) and collateral also lead to higher credit availability.
Significantly, a good median credit situation in the public credit register leads to higher credit
availability, suggesting that the Central de Deudores eases credit constraints for good firms.
As to the cost of credit, the findings mostly parallel those of credit availability. The cost is
smaller for a firm with a close relationship to a bank. Firms with large assets, a high
sales/assets ratio, and a low debt/assets ratio pay a lower interest rate (returns over assets,
however, turn out not to be significant). A good credit history and collateral also reduce the
interest rate.
An important difference between the effects on the price and the quantity of credit is
that the interest rate does not increase monotonically as the credit situation deteriorates,
unlike credit availability that decreases monotonically. Similarly, the median credit situation
in the public credit register does not affect the cost. These findings are consistent with credit
rationing, which predicts that beyond a certain point it makes no sense for the lender to raise
interest rates because that only increases the probability of default. Rather, as risk rises,
lenders will cut back credit.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 places our approach on how public and
private information impacts the market for bank loans in the context of the existing literature
on the topic. Section 3 describes the dataset constructed to characterize the workings of the
loan market for firms in Argentina. Section 4 presents our regressions on the cost of credit
and the access to credit at the margin. Section 5 presents the conclusions, as well as
suggestions for further work.
2. Conceptual framework
We briefly review the theoretical literature on the role of information in credit markets, and
previous empirical studies on how it affects the cost and access to credit of firms.
2.1. Theoretical literature
4Informational asymmetries are a central issue in credit markets. Freixas and Rochet (1997)
distinguish between three settings of asymmetric information: ex-ante asymmetric
information (adverse selection), interim asymmetric information (moral hazard), and ex-post
asymmetric information (costly state verification model, that can be related to ex-post moral
hazard).
In the theoretical literature, asymmetric information has been identified as the source
of equilibrium credit rationing. Asymmetric information pushes the market away from that of
a perfectly competitive equilibrium where the intersection of demand and supply clear the
market. The classic contribution by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) predicts that a lender's
expected return on a risky loan is a non-monotonic function of the interest rate. This can be
due either to adverse selection, because as interest rates rise the best borrowers drop out,
or to moral hazard, because at higher interest rates borrowers adopt riskier strategies.
Hence, lenders may not be willing to supply more credit beyond a certain interest rate. This
may lead to a credit rationing equilibrium, where borrowers are willing to demand more than
they are supplied at the equilibrium interest rate. This type of credit rationing is an intensive
limit, or type 1 credit rationing. If lenders refuse outright to supply any loans at all to some of
the prospective customers at the prevailing interest rate, the borrower faces instead an
extensive limit, or type 2 credit rationing. This is for example the case in the costly state
verification version of credit rationing in Williamson (1987).
To alleviate the degree of asymmetric information, banks resort to different
mechanisms. Banks are precisely the organizations that specialize in recollecting information
on potential borrowers, to price credit risks appropriately.1 A common practice by banks is to
implement screening mechanisms (alternatively, good firms have an incentive to signal their
type, in order to differentiate themselves from bad firms and get better terms on their loans).
Another response to the problem of asymmetric information is the development of private
information through banking relationships.
In this regard, Petersen and Rajan (1994) distinguish between public and private
information in lending activities. Private information is the information that lenders acquire in
the course of relationships with borrowers, information that is not easily transferable to
others. In this same line, Berger, Klapper, and Udell (2000) contrast relationship lending to
pure transactions lending. Relationship lending is based on information gathered by the
lender through contact over time with the firm, its owner, and the local business community.
Pure transactions lending is based on information from financial statements, credit scoring
                                                                
1 Banks can also be important to monitor borrowers, solving corporate governance problems related to moral hazard (cf. Allen,
2001).
5and other similar quantitative techniques. This information is relatively public and
transparent, and only requires the analysis of currently available data.
The idea of relationship lending is already in Akerlof (1970), in his example of local
moneylenders in credit markets in India who can profitably lend because of their knowledge
of local borrowers’ creditworthiness. Outside middlemen trying to arbitrage in that market,
lending at the same high rates, would lose money due to the risk of attracting borrowers with
poor repayment prospects. The emergence of financial intermediaries such as banks can
thus be explained as a way to solve the problem of asymmetric information in financial
markets.
Relationship information is especially important for small firms. Small firms produce
less public information than large firms, which can instead resort directly to capital markets
to place debt (Diamond, 1991). Relationships affect the bank-firm interaction in at least two
dimensions. Concerning the amount of credit, Diamond (1984) shows that relationships
allow a firm to have more access to credit. With respect to the cost of credit, there is no
clear-cut association between interest rates and relationships. On the one hand, Diamond
(1984) shows that a relationship with a single bank may reduce risk, leading to a lower
interest rate charged. The reduction in interest rates is due both to the monitoring role of the
bank, that reduces the incidence of moral hazard, and to an improved knowledge of the firm,
that helps to overcome the problem of adverse selection. On the other hand, relationships
provide a bank with private information that is not verifiable. The bank that lends to a firm
learns more about it than other banks. This informational advantage gives the bank market
power over the firm, allowing it to extract rents attributable to knowing that the borrower is
less risky than average (Sharpe, 1990). Summarizing, there are theoretical justifications for
both an increase and decrease of a firm’s interest rate with closer relationships.
Whether other information is either private or public depends on the regulations in
place, like laws of habeas data that guarantee privacy. Public credit registers and private
credit bureaus that pool the information of lenders allow a reduction of the degree of
asymmetric information. Since information is costly to produce, other lenders might have an
incentive to free ride and compete away the banks’ best clients if it becomes public
information, which may reduce the incentives of banks to invest in relationship lending in the
first place. While this may be the case for positive information on borrowers, negative
information helps to discipline borrowers, reducing problems of moral hazard.
Asymmetric information and agency problems are not the only source of credit
market imperfections. For example, an inefficient legal system may diminish the value of
collateral, leading to a credit constrained equilibrium where firms cannot carry out all their
6worthwhile investment opportunities despite the guarantees they can provide. Even if there
is no credit rationing, because interest rates rise to clear the market, firms suffer from credit
constraints due to these inefficiencies. These problems can contribute to weak international
financial links and an underdeveloped domestic financial market (Caballero and
Krishnamurthy, 1999).
2.2.  Empirical literature
Much of the literature on credit constraints faced by firms focuses on its effects on
investment, which can be detected through the excess sensitivity of investment to liquidity
(Schiantarelli, 1996, provides a survey of this literature). There is also a specific literature
that looks at how bank relationships can contribute to ease liquidity constraints faced by
firms. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990), for instance, look at the associations of firms
with banks in Japan, showing that the benefit of bank association for Japanese firms is that it
reduces the excess sensitivity of investment to cash flow in times of financial distress.
We follow a different tack. Our approach resembles Petersen and Rajan (1994) in
that we try to look more closely at the issue of credit availability in itself. The key insight in
Petersen and Rajan is that the use of trade credit can be an indication of credit constraints.
In their study of small business firms in the U.S., the average rate on bank loans is 1% per
month, or 12% per year. They calculate that firms that do not take discounts for early
payment forsake a 2% discount to stretch the payment period 20 days more, equivalent to a
3% monthly interest rate, or a 44% annual interest rate. Accordingly, they use the
percentage of discounts taken for early payment as an indication of firms that do not face
credit constraints, because they have access to cheaper credit from the financial system.
Conversely, the percentage of trade credit paid late is an indication of credit constrained
firms.
If trade credit discounts taken is an indirect indicator of credit availability in banks, an
alternative is to try to assess credit availability in banks directly. This is meaningful if line of
credit contracts, or loan commitment contracts, are an important source of loans. Melnik and
Plaut (1986) state that loan commitment contracts are behind more than 70% of commercial
and industrial loans in the U.S. They study the ex-ante tradeoffs between size of loan
commitments, and other variables such as interest rate premium charged, and collateral
offered. Since they concentrate on the ex-ante determinants of lines of credit contracts,
Melnik and Plaut provide no evidence on credit constraints per se. They do mention that
credit constraints can be interpreted as the ex-post usage of credit beyond these loan
commitment contracts, when firms have to turn to spot loans at higher rates.
7Putting together the approaches in Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Melnik and Plaut
(1986), we propose the unused portion of pre-committed credit lines as a measure of firms
that are not credit constrained. Unused credit lines can be interpreted as an intensive, not an
extensive, measure of credit constraints. An extensive credit constraint is the case when no
bank is willing ex-ante to sign a line of credit contract with a firm. All the firms in our sample
have bank credit, so they do not face this type of constraint (except a few firms in our sample
that only have write-offs). However, even those firms that are given a credit line face a
maximum credit limit or commitment. This limit is potentially an intensive credit constraint.
Firms that ex-post have unused credit lines are not credit constrained, but the lack of unused
credit lines may provide direct evidence on firms that face intensive credit constraints. We
also believe that unused credit lines may be a less ambiguous measure of credit availability
than total debt figures that are often used in the literature.
As to the effect of banking relationships on access to credit, Petersen and Rajan
(1994) show how their measures of lending relationships are related to less reliance on trade
credit. They interpret this in the sense that firms with closer relationships face less credit
constraints, having more access to cheaper bank credit. Later studies also find that
relationships lead to more access to credit, using different measures of credit availability.
Cole (1998) finds that a potential lender is more likely to extend credit to a firm with which it
has a pre-existing relationship. Machauer and Weber (2000) find that a firm obtains a higher
proportion of financing from a bank with which it has a closer relationships, using as
dependent variable the ratio of the total credit line at each bank relative to the total assets of
the firm.
In relation to the effects of relationships on the cost of credit, using the interest rate
paid on the last loan of each firm, Petersen and Rajan find that lending relationships affect
the quantity of credit more than they affect the cost of credit. Their measure of number of
banks, that signals a weaker relationship, is related to a higher cost of credit, but the length
of the relationship does not affect interest rates at all. On the contrary, also using the interest
rate paid on the last loan, Berger and Udell (1995) find that borrowers with longer banking
relationships pay lower interest rates. However, they restrict their analysis to lending under
lines of credit. A recent study by D’Auria, Foglia and Marullo-Reedtz (1999) establishes that
close relationships reduce the interest rate a firm is charged on uncollateralized overdraft
facilities, using as a proxy of close relationships the share of each bank over the total credit
lines granted by the banking system to individual borrowers. They also control for the
number of banks as a measure of competition, which of course interacts with the
concentration of the credit in a bank. They interpret their results in the sense that having
closer relationships leads to lower rates, but that there is a holdup problem if a firm operates
8exclusively with one bank. A little bit of competition among banks reinforces the reduction in
the firm’s interest rate, while increasing the number of banks still more leads to pay higher
interest rates. We propose to look at a measure of the cost of bank credit faced by a firm at
the margin. We recur to the most expensive type of loan, overdrafts. We pick the highest
observed interest rate on overdrafts paid by a firm in the financial system. This account
should be the last one used by a firm, which would attempt to exhaust cheaper sources of
credit first.
3. Dataset
A database was assembled, drawing information mainly from the Central de Deudores del
Sistema Financiero (Center of Debtors of the Financial System) of the Banco Central de la
República Argentina (BCRA). As mentioned in the Introduction, we refer to all financial
institutions as banks. The information on firms comprises incorporated firms that are “large
debtors” or “principal debtors” of the financial system, which does not necessarily mean that
they are large firms.
We put together a cross-section of interest rates and debt of firms with each
individual bank for October 2000. This Section describes the main characteristics of this
dataset. Previous researchers working with Central de Deudores, such as Berger, Klapper
and Udell (2000), did not use the information on interest rates and on the balance sheets of
firms because they considered the information was too unreliable, if not altogether useless.
To overcome the drawbacks in the underlying information, extensive preparatory
groundwork was done before running the econometric estimates.
3.2 Bank liabilities
The information on the liabilities of each firm with the financial system covers four items:
loans, unused credit lines, shares not quoted on the stock exchange, and write-offs. Though
unused credit lines are a potential liability, we will simply call the aggregate figure “bank
liabilities”. This information on quantities is validated by the BCRA: the total for each item,
added up over all the clients of each bank, has to agree with the amount reported by the
bank to the BCRA on its balance sheet. If these totals do not coincide, the information is
rejected.
Table 4 shows the liabilities for our complete sample of firms (including those that
only have write-offs) for October 2000. The average number of operations refers to the
number of banks with which firms operate on average for each line.
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Item Total ($1,000)  
Total/no. of 
firms*           
Firms with  
line (%)
Total/firms 
with line
Average  no. 
operations
Total/ no. 
operations
Loans 41,460,414 2,576 96.2 2,677 3.1 850
Unused credit lines 4,892,558 304 41.9 726 1.6 454
Unquoted shares 1,209,843 75 1.1 7,117 2.1 3,467
Write-offs 720,395 45 9.3 483 1.9 251
Total 48,283,210 3,000 100.0 3,000 3.3 905
*16,095 firms with bank liabilities reported in October 2000.
Source: Central de Deudores, BCRA.
Breakdown of Bank Liabilities
According to Información de Entidades Financieras published by the BCRA, liabilities
in the whole financial system in September 2000 added up to 102 billion pesos, of which 36
billion corresponded to partnerships/sole proprietorships (5,162,305 cases) and 66 billion to
corporations (116,960 cases). Our complete database of 16,095 firms adds up to 48 billion
pesos in October 2000. These firms represent a little under 15% of the corporations, but
over 75% of the debt of incorporated firms.
3.3. Interest rates on loans
Interest rates on each type of loan, as well as the average duration of these loans, is
available since October 2000. The BCRA has not yet implemented a validation procedure
similar to that applied to quantities, so interest rate figures are not very reliable. Appendix B
describes how this information was processed. The validated interest rate information is
presented in Table 7 (the total cases in the original database are listed in the last column).
Table 7
Total
Type of Loan Mean  (%) Median  (%) Std deviation Cases* cases**
Overdrafts 2.54 2.04 1.6 15,529 23,720
Discounted bills - guarantee A 2.22 2.17 0.4 20 21
Bills and promissory notes 1.28 1.19 0.5 13,465 19,517
House mortgages 1.04 1.02 0.2 77 103
Other mortgages 1.14 1.08 0.6 2,724 4,589
Car loans 1.41 1.46 0.3 509 660
Other pledges 1.27 1.20 0.9 2,530 5,279
Personal 1.82 1.75 0.7 530 1,198
Credit card 2.43 2.59 0.9 1,727 3,283
Interfinancial 4.97 0.75 19.9 132 216
To guaranteed public bank 0.91 0.90 0.1 7 7
Other loans 1.39 1.28 0.8 5,488 9,712
Other financial 1.07 1.00 0.5 1,282 7,327
Leases 1.25 1.28 0.3 481 1,323
Miscellaneous 1.09 0.99 0.8 47 59
Small personal 1.12 0.99 0.2 5 5
*Restricted to rates with montly values over 0.1. 
**All observations, including  rates <=0.1, as well as rates reported by banks that were excluded for misreporting figures.
Source: Central de Deudores, BCRA.
Interest Rates in Validated Sample
Validated sample
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Bank overdrafts are, on average, the most expensive type of loans. We disregard
information on inter-financial loans, because these rates are still badly misreported in the
transformed sample, since they did not even reach 2% per month in the year 2000. Besides,
this assistance does not qualify for our sample that targets non-financial firms. The only
other rate that is close to overdrafts is the rate charged on credit cards.
3.4. Marginal cost of credit
Petersen and Rajan (1994) use the cost of the last loan to measure the price of credit. This
could be interpreted as an attempt to capture the cost of loans at the margin. We explicitly
try to isolate a measure of the cost of bank credit faced by a firm at the margin. To identify
the marginal cost, we recur to the most expensive type of loan, overdrafts. We then pick the
highest observed interest rate on overdrafts paid by a firm in the financial system. This
account should be the last one used by a firm, which would attempt to exhaust cheaper
sources of credit first.
Applying this definition, the marginal rate turned out to be slightly above 3% per
month (with small fluctuations according to the specific sub-sample of firms used). We could
have used instead the highest observed interest rate charged on any type of loan. However,
in 85% of the cases of firms that use overdrafts, the highest rate is indeed the rate charged
on overdrafts. As to the relevance of the interest rate on overdrafts, Table 5 shows that 65%
of the firms in our dataset used overdrafts in October 2000.
An advantage of only using overdrafts is that we have a homogeneous type of loan
that reduces the influence of unobserved loan characteristics on the cost of credit. The rate
charged on overdrafts can be reviewed monthly.
Since overdrafts are very short-term liabilities, they are overwhelmingly denominated
in pesos. As the maturity lengthens, debt tends to be denominated in dollars. This is most
clearly so for the debts with longest maturity, house mortgages.
Credit card lines are similar to overdrafts in several aspects. In particular, credit cards
are subject both to pre-established rates and to credit limits characteristic of loan
commitment contracts. We could have bunched both types of assistance together. However,
we decided against doing that because they are not completely homogeneous lines.
According to Table 5, the average size of operations with credit cards is substantially smaller
than that of overdrafts, and their use by firms is much less widespread.
3.5. Access to additional credit
Two possible alternatives as a measure of credit constraints are the percentage of overdrafts
over total bank credit, and the percentage of authorized overdrafts effectively drawn on.
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As to the first alternative, our conjecture was that overdrafts would be the last type of
loan a firm would resort to in the financial system. Overdrafts are more expensive than other
types of loans. Moreover, their cost at the margin resembles the trade credit paid late
variable in Petersen and Rajan (1994), that was charged a rate of 3% per month. If trade
credit paid late could indicate that the firm faced credit constraints, we thought that a high
percentage of overdrafts over total bank loans could indicate that very same thing. However,
we ran into a snag, as Table 9 shows. The first column presents the median of a firm’s credit
situation in all banks. The credit situation for firms goes from 1 (the best credit standing) to 5
(the worst credit standing), while 6 is a technical category for delinquent loans with failed
banks (cf. Appendix C).
Table 9
Median of 
credit 
situation Total cases
Firms using 
overdrafts 
(%)
Overdrafts/ 
bank loans**  
(%)
1 11,788 71.5 31.7
1.5 306 67.6 21.5
2 581 51.6 28.1
2.5 214 58.9 24.8
3 497 46.3 29.5
3.5 149 57.0 25.3
4 909 63.5 33.0
4.5 220 48.6 37.0
5 1,352 31.4 33.0
5.5 32 28.1 23.5
6 47 29.8 35.3
*This refers to complete database of 16,095 firms.
**This refers only to firms actually using overdrafts.
Source: Central de Deudores, BCRA.
Overdrafts Drawn by Credit Situation*
Though the percentage of credit drawn through overdrafts is roughly constant across
categories, the percentage of firms that actually use overdrafts tends to fall as the credit
situation deteriorates. This seems to indicate that firms are cut off from overdrafts when they
run into financial trouble. Unlike trade credit, whose supply might be thought of as pretty
elastic, overdrafts are part of loan commitment contracts that are subject to a prior approval
process. This illustrates why the use of overdrafts is an ambiguous indicator of credit
rationing. Even if it is the most expensive source of credit in the financial system, the firms in
worst shape have less access to it. In this sense, overdrafts have problems similar to
leverage indicators discussed in Section 4.
The second alternative incorporated the feature that overdrafts are a line of credit
contract subject to pre-defined quotas. Our conjecture was that the amount of unused
overdrafts could provide valuable information to identify firms that were not credit
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constrained. Firms in good condition would tend to use overdrafts little, while firms in bad
shape would tend to exhaust their available credit. Since overdrafts have a limit, and could
be expected to be the last source of credit that a firm would resort to, once that limit is hit
one would expect the firm to be credit constrained in the financial system.
However, we realized that, at core, Petersen and Rajan (1994) used trade credit
discounts taken as a shadow indicator of credit availability in banks in general. From the
start, we had such a measure of credit availability in our hands. Though we had initially
thought in terms of the unused portion of authorized overdrafts, banks provide detailed
information to the central bank on all unused credit lines that are part of loan commitment
contracts. This perspective also ties in with the ideas in Melnik and Plaut (1986) on credit
constraints having to do with the ex-post usage of credit beyond the amounts agreed on
beforehand in loan commitment contracts.
As mentioned above, the BCRA requires banks to provision unused credit lines for credit
risk unless the credit line is revocable at any time, so the figures of unused credit lines
basically reflect loans backed by loan commitment contracts that have been granted but not
drawn. The following table shows the behavior of unused overdrafts in columns three and
four, while columns five and six refer to total unused credit lines, that includes unused
overdrafts.
Table 10
Median of Total cases
credit 
situation % firms
as % of  
liabilities* % firms
as % of 
liabilities**
1 11,788 37.2 10.8 52.6 21.3
1.5 306 23.5 6.2 33.0 11.2
2 581 15.8 7.1 22.2 9.8
2.5 214 9.3 11.8 16.4 13.1
3 497 9.7 8.2 18.1 15.3
3.5 149 6.7 14.7 10.7 10.3
4 909 2.9 13.2 10.1 8.3
4.5 220 1.8 17.3 7.3 11.4
5 1,352 0.7 10.9 4.0 9.3
5.5 32 0.0 0.2 6.3 0.2
6 47 4.3 24.4 6.4 25.3
*This refers only to firms that actually have unused overdrafts.
**This refers only to firms that actually have unused credit lines.
Source: Central de Deudores, BCRA.
Unused Credit Lines by Credit Situation
Unused overdrafts Unused credit lines
For example, column five shows that 53% of firms with a median credit standing of 1
have unused credit lines, while the last column shows that this represents 21% of their bank
liabilities. Only a large number of firms with the best credit situation have unused credit lines
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at hand, and these represent a larger share of their bank liabilities. Unused overdrafts follow
approximately the same pattern, but they are less representative of available sources of
funds in banks. For that reason, our final measure of credit availability was unused credit
lines as a percentage of liabilities with the financial system.
4. Econometric evidence
Our goal here is to see what can be learned on the high cost and the limited access of firms
to credit in Argentina from the cross-sectional variation among firms. We try to measure the
cost and the availability of bank credit at the margin. Our methodology is inspired by
Petersen and Rajan (1994). Besides some differences in the right-hand variables that in
particular extend the study to see the impact of credit history, we use different left-hand
variables, which can be related to the ideas of loan commitment contracts in Melnik and
Plaut (1986).
The cost of credit is captured by the marginal interest rate that a firm has to pay on
overdrafts. As to the access to credit, we start by running some regressions based on
leverage similar to those commonly used in the literature. However, high leverage is
inherently ambiguous because they may indicate either a firm with high credit availability or a
firm in financial distress. We then propose an alternative approach to detect credit
constrained firms based on the proportion of outstanding credit lines.
In each case, we first run regressions for different subsets of information, to see if
more restrictive validation criteria lead to more precise estimates. Naturally, a more
restrictive validation criterion leaves fewer observations, hopefully of better quality for the
problem analyzed. So there is an implicit trade-off when restricting the sample where
degrees of freedom are sacrificed to obtain more relevant observations.
We are interested in evaluating how information affects credit conditions. If banks can
screen between good and bad credits more easily, this should reduce the problem of
lemons, improving the access to credit of good firms. Do close relationships matter? It
seems they do, reducing the cost of credit and increasing the access to credit. We interpret
that firms with closer ties to financial institutions not only share a lot of information with
banks, they also show they are good credits. Otherwise, if the firm were bad, the bank would
want to turn away from the relationship once it got to know the firm better.
Does credit history matter? It seems to matter, but whereas the negative effect on the
access to credit seems to increase monotonically as the credit history deteriorates, the effect
on interest rates is more of a step function. This makes sense from the perspective of credit
rationing, since raising the interest rates to firms in very bad shape only increases the
probability of default.
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Public information also seems to matter, since the credit history in other financial
institutions impacts the access to credit of a bank’s client. We also control for characteristics
of a firm from financial statements, as well as for characteristics of banks and loans, and,
when possible, for the industrial sector to which the firm belongs.
4.1 Overdraft rate at marginal bank
In the interest rate regression, our dependent variable is the interest rate paid by firms on
their overdraft account. We consider that this account is the informative account. In case a
firm uses more than one overdraft account, the paper uses the overdraft account that pays
the highest interest rate. Using this definition, the marginal overdraft interest rate is on
average slightly above 3% per month.
The fact that a firm can switch overnight from one account to another, or from one
bank to another, canceling its outstanding overdrafts, allows to interpret the most expensive
overdraft account used as the marginal account. As discussed in Section 3, the interest rate
on overdrafts is an interest rate relevant for most of the firms with relationship with the
financial sector, and it is used more often than any other single line. In those firms actually
using overdrafts, it is almost always the highest recorded rate.
From an econometric perspective, the advantage of concentrating the analysis on the
rate of a specific credit line is that we do not have to model the influence of line-specific
factors that affect the underlying rate. Those controls would be necessary if the analysis
were to be made on the highest rate charged on any line. In addition, the characteristic that
this account is priced monthly facilitates the estimation procedure, because there is no need
to introduce extra variables to measure the underlying cost. The constant of the regression
should capture it. The paper estimates the following regression function:
Highest overdraft interest rate =  b0 + b1 Firm specific information + b2 Industry
dummies  + b3  Loan and lender characteristics +  b4 Credit history + b5
Measures of Relationships  + e
The equation introduces controls for firm specific information, industry dummies, and
loan and lender characteristics. We follow Petersen and Rajan (1994) in using relationship
characteristics to capture the influence of private information. Variables on credit history, not
used by Petersen and Rajan (1994), are also introduced in the regressions. Greene (1992)
emphasizes the role of credit history for interest rates and access to credit. Parameters are
estimated by ordinary least squares using the Eicker-White heteroskedasticity consistent
estimator for standard errors.
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The columns of Table 12 display four different sets of firms. Regression one
corresponds to the complete sample, while regression two applies a filter to eliminate
problematic observations (roa=0, and cases where either assets or liabilities or net worth are
between 0 and 1 thousand pesos). Regression three corresponds to registers where at least
two sources agree on the information (validation criteria 1/2/3/5/7). Regression four also
includes firms whose balance sheet information has been regularly updated by a bank
(validation criterion 13). This information, though it cannot be crossed with other reports,
seems to behave pretty much like the information that can be checked. Given the large
heterogeneity of the sample considered, the possible presence of outliers that can seriously
affect least squares estimates cannot be discarded in advance. We also estimated all
models using robust methods. We used Huber’s biweight function based on Cook’s distance
(see Wilcox, 1997, for details). The robust estimates (not shown) are fairly similar to those
obtained by OLS, so outliers do not affect the estimation significantly.
Though we are more confident in the samples of regressions three and four, the
estimates in Table 12 are not very sensitive to the specific sample used. In the initial
estimates, many coefficients in the first two regressions had signs significantly different from
the last two regressions. Once more controls were put in place, the most noteworthy
difference is that in the first two regressions lndebt/assets is not statistically significant, and
that roa has a negative sign (though it is never statistically significant).2 Please see Appendix
D for a full description of the right-hand variables.
Table 12
                                                                
2 All the variables defined as lnx are calculated adding 1 thousand pesos to x, so ln(1+x) is the actual explanatory variable. This
transformation is due to the many zeros that appear in the regression with the complete sample. Otherwise we would lose a lot
of observations.
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Explanatory variables
Complete 
sample
Complete 
sample
+
Reduced 
sample
++
Reduced 
sample 
+++
roa 0.000 0.000 0.076 0.075
(-1.12) (-1.12) (1.06) (1.07)
lnassets -0.100 -0.125 -0.150 -0.129
(-9.18)*** (-8.72)*** (-6.85)*** (-6.98)***
lnsales/assets -0.246 -0.245 -0.189 -0.180
(-6.39)*** (-5.32)*** (-2.36)** (-2.68)***
lndebt/assets 0.011 0.154 0.624 0.452
(0.12) (1.41) (2.83)*** (2.45)**
sector 0 0.215 0.110 -0.160 0.020
(3.25)*** (1.40) (-1.15) (0.19)
sector 1 0.129 0.130 -0.004 0.110
(2.24)** (2.03)** (-0.04) (1.22)
sector 3 -0.033 -0.075 -0.434 -0.237
(-0.16) (-0.35) (-1.31) (-0.87)
sector 5 -0.059 0.010 -0.306 -0.244
(-0.29) (0.05) (-1.12) (-0.96)
sector 6 0.272 0.223 0.163 0.220
(3.78)*** (2.84)*** (1.38) (2.09)**
sector 7 0.110 0.066 -0.086 -0.003
(2.16)** (1.19) (-1.05) (-0.04)
sector 8 0.302 0.266 0.158 0.198
(5.65)*** (4.55)*** (1.76)* (2.54)**
situation 2 0.652 0.539 0.511 0.577
(6.32)*** (4.71)*** (2.98)*** (3.72)***
situation 3 0.252 0.258 0.002 0.084
(2.62)*** (2.44)** (0.01) (0.56)
situation 4 0.422 0.501 0.538 0.475
(5.87)*** (6.23)*** (4.66)*** (4.45)***
situation 5 0.228 0.121 0.170 0.205
(2.22)** (0.97) (0.95) (1.23)
situation 6 0.811 0.994 0.698 0.767
(2.55)** (2.41)** (1.69)* (1.90)*
lnbounced/liabilities 0.048 0.049 0.072 0.066
(5.42)*** (4.88)*** (4.62)*** (4.67)***
unwarranted/overdrafts 0.896 0.903 0.893 0.963
(10.19)*** (9.09)*** (5.49)*** (6.90)***
foreign bank=1 0.198 0.153 0.165 0.146
(5.09)*** (3.54)*** (2.51)** (2.55)**
public bank=1 0.110 0.213 0.295 0.261
(1.27) (1.99)* (1.70)* (1.63)
wholesale bank=1 -1.000 -1.005 -0.989 -1.011
(-11.33)*** (-10.62)*** (-7.99)*** (-8.90)***
bank's market share -8.779 -9.118 -9.484 -8.724
(-15.54)*** (-14.56)*** (-9.84)*** (-10.36)***
liabilities bank/system -0.690 -0.647 -0.653 -0.646
(-11.21)*** (-9.27)*** (-5.39)*** (-6.45)***
no. banks 0.069 0.084 0.092 0.090
(9.06)*** (10.11)*** (8.45)*** (8.89)***
no. credit lines -0.129 -0.136 -0.133 -0.142
(-7.23)*** (-6.84)*** (-4.38)*** (-5.37)***
_cons 3.525 3.646 3.617 3.396
(24.65)*** (20.68)*** (12.73)*** (14.33)***
Number of observations 8548 7010 3112 3963
F 63.44 55.34 25.91 33.52
Prob > F 0 0 0 0
R-squared 0.1569 0.1653 0.1735 0.1755
Adj R-squared 0.1544 0.1623 0.1668 0.1703
Root MSE 1.58 1.5859 1.6279 1.5897
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS
 +
Excludes roa=0 and balance sheets with problems.
 
++
 Validation criteria 1/2/3/5/7 in Appendix A.
 
+++
 Validation criteria 1/2/3/5/7/13 in Appendix A.
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis. 1, 2 and 3 asterisks indicate significance at 10%, 5% or 1%.
Interest Rate Regressions: Different Sub-samples
The main results on the cost of credit (skipping the controls for industry dummies
sector*) are as follows. Looking at a firm’s characteristics, the cost of credit is negatively and
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significantly associated with the amount of assets (lnassets ), and the sales/assets ratio
(lnsales/assets), while it is positively and significantly related with the firm’s debt/assets ratio
(lndebt/assets). As to credit history, the cost of credit is positively related to a worse credit
situation (situation*) and to bounced checks in the marginal bank (lnbounced/liabilities).
However, in the case of credit situation the coefficients are not always significant, and they
do not increase with the deterioration of the credit situation. Relationship variables show that
the cost of credit is negatively and significantly associated with debt concentration in the
marginal bank (liabilities bank/system ), and to the number of accounts in the marginal bank
(no. credit lines), but it is positively and significantly related to the number of banks (no.
banks). While Table 11 shows that the number of banks increases with the size of liabilities
in the financial system, the regressions control for the size of firms (lnassets), so an effect of
size can be ruled out. Other significant controls show that less collateral
(unwarranted/overdrafts) leads to pay higher interest rates. Marginal banks that are
wholesale (wholesale bank) or large (bank’s market share) charge lower interest rates, and
marginal banks that are foreign (foreign bank) charge higher interest rates.3
We want to comment in more detail the effects of credit history. The variable on
bounced checks is measured as the ratio in the marginal bank between the amount in
bounced checks from January to September 2000, and liabilities. There are five dummy
variables on credit situation of each firm. Situation 1 is omitted, so it acts as the benchmark.
Although not all parameters are significantly different from zero in the four estimates, all of
the coefficients are positive. This indicates that firms with poor credit situation tend to pay
higher interest rates. What’s more, if only a dummy for credit situation 1 is included, it is
negative and statistically significant (we do not show the regression for space
considerations). The interest rates do not increase as the credit situation worsens to
situation 4, which corresponds to firms under debt rescheduling proceedings, or situation 5,
which corresponds to firms filing for bankruptcy. Since situation 6 is a technical category that
represents arrears with financial institutions that went broke, it cannot be ranked as worse
than either situation 4 or 5. These results may be interpreted as an indication of credit
rationing. As the risk of default increases, beyond a certain point it makes no sense to
increase the interest rate further. Rather, banks will simply cut back the amount of credit, as
we discuss below.
As to the relationship variables, the variable liabilities bank/system is an indication of
how deep the marginal bank’s involvement in the firm is. An increase in this variable means
that the bank has a higher stake in the firm. This higher exposition assumed by a bank also
                                                                
3 The dummies for type of bank might in part capture characteristics of firms, e.g. prime firms tend to operate with large banks.
It is not clear why foreign banks charge higher rates. Though Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) find that foreign
banks charge higher spreads than domestic banks in developing countries, they do not specifically relate it to higher loan rates.
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generates the right incentive to monitor the firm carefully. On the other hand, it could
possibly indicate that the firm does not have access to other banks. In this case the
parameter of this variable should have a positive sign, signaling the firm’s risk. According to
the result of Table 12, the effect of debt concentration in the marginal bank is explained by
the first hypothesis.
A second variable to control for relationships, no. credit lines, is the number of
accounts the firm is using in the marginal bank. Each type of bank account generates
different information. Although not all accounts are informative, we consider the total number
of accounts as a proxy for informative accounts. The results from the regressions show that
firms with more accounts are charged lower interest rates.
A third variable for relationships, no. banks, does not have a straightforward sign.
The issues are similar to the variable liabilities bank/system.4 On the one hand, this variable
could signal that a firm wants to diversify its financing sources to not be a captive client of a
single bank. If this is the case, an increase in the number of banks should reduce the interest
rate. On the other hand, this variable could signal that the relationship is weaker, in which
case an increase in the number of banks should go hand in hand with an increase in the
interest rate paid. The interest rate paid could also rise if more banks signaled that the
marginal bank can not monitor as effectively the firm, or also if it signals that the main bank
cut the firm’s access to credit, forcing it to seek other lenders. According to the results in
Table 12, firms that operate in more banks are charged higher interest rates, so it signals
either weaker relationships, or moral hazard and quality problems. Taking into account the
quantity effects to be discussed below, the additional effects of the variable no. banks may
indeed be an indication of firms that need to resort to finance at another bank because they
are cut off by their main lender.
4.3. Proportion of unused credit lines in main bank
To avoid the problems that leverage presents as a measure of availability of credit, we turn
to unused credit lines in the financial system. In principle this indicates not how much credit
a firm has used, but rather how much it has available through loan commitment contracts.
We started to work with unused credit lines at the system level. However, we prefer
to focus here on an alternative formulation where the dependent variable is the portion of
unused credit lines in the main bank, i.e. the bank where the largest share of liabilities are
concentrated. The characteristics of the lender correspond to the main bank, except for the
                                                                
4 Note that the number of banks (no. banks) is not completely independent from the concentration of business in the marginal
bank (liabilities bank/system). This is forcefully so when no. banks=1, which implies liabilities bank/system=1. However, the
mean value of no. bank  in regression four is 5.1 banks. Besides, the two variables do not have a very high positive correlation.
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few cases two banks were tied in first place, when we included both. This allows a better
estimation of the effect of the relationship variables, since variables taken from the main
bank are weaker explaining available credit lines on a system-wide basis, and it makes no
sense to define some of our relationship variables in terms of the whole system.
Our hypothesis was that unused credit lines indicated a firm that was not credit
constrained, while the opposite meant a firm that was. Therefore, the estimation should
consider both zeros and the non-zero unused credit lines, because both are informative.
The formulation to capture the access to credit is the amount of unused credit lines granted
by financial institutions to firms is thus:
Unused Credit Line in Main Bank =  b0 + b1 Firm specific information  +  b2  Industry
dummies    +  b3 loan and lender characteristics + b4 Credit history + b5
Measure of relationships  +  e0
We used a standard two-part selection model.5 The model was estimated by both full
information maximum likelihood and the Heckman two-step procedure. On one hand, the
likelihood function for the normal selection model is well known to be numerically difficult to
handle, which calls for two-stage type methods. On the other hand, as in the case of this
paper, when the selection equation shares many explanatory variables with the regression
equation, the identification of the second stage of Heckman’s method may suffer from a very
high multicollinearity between the explanatory variables in the regression equation and the
additional regressor included to correct for the selection bias. We used both methods to
handle this issue and compare estimation results. We show the results of the Heckman two-
step procedure, but estimates using both methods do not differ substantially (see Nawata
and Nagase, 1996, for more details on estimating selection models). Consistent standard
errors for the selection model are computed as in Greene (1997, p. 981).
Table 15 presents the results of the regression equation, while the selection equation
is relegated to Appendix E1.
Table 15
                                                                
5 Initially, since the dependent variable is limited to the [0,1] closed interval, parameters were estimated as in Petersen and
Rajan (1994) using a two-limit Tobit specification. This specification implicitly assumes, in terms of the general selectivity
model, that the regression equation is also the selection equation. In this final version, by allowing these two equations to differ
we can distinguish between two effects. First, what determines whether a firm has an unused credit line or not (a 0/1 decision).
Second, of those firms with unused credit lines, what determines the amount of unused credit lines. The determinants turn out
to be similar in both steps. Hence, at least qualitatively, results of the selectivity model replicate those of our initial two-limit
Tobit specification.
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Explanatory variables Complete sample Complete sample
+
Reduced sample
++
Reduced sample 
+++
roa 0.003 0.002 0.119 0.140
(0.88) (0.48) (1.14) (1.78)*
lnassets 0.063 0.083 0.096 0.090
(5.16)*** (11.05)*** (7.78)*** (8.81)***
lnsales/assets 0.117 0.147 0.100 0.105
(4.50)*** (5.50)*** (2.10)** (2.73)***
lndebt/assets -0.096 -0.130 -0.279 -0.253
(-1.80)* (-2.32)** (-2.25)** (-2.54)**
sector 0 -0.045 0.000 -0.022 -0.047
(-0.94) (-0.01) (-0.29) (-0.86)
sector 1 -0.269 -0.222 -0.222 -0.219
(-4.25)*** (-6.44)*** (-3.71)*** (-4.47)***
sector 3 0.104 0.145 0.286 0.204
(1.03) (1.37) (1.71)* (1.43)
sector 5 -0.055 -0.085 -0.042 -0.065
(-0.54) (-0.80) (-0.29) (-0.48)
sector 6 -0.026 -0.007 0.002 -0.036
(-0.59) (-0.16) (0.03) (-0.62)
sector 7 -0.083 -0.092 -0.070 -0.092
(-1.67)* (-2.89)*** (-1.42) (-2.20)**
sector 8 -0.068 -0.069 -0.063 -0.081
(-1.42) (-2.14)** (-1.25) (-1.90)*
situation 2 -0.299 -0.259 -0.286 -0.257
(-5.17)*** (-4.58)*** (-2.78)*** (-2.81)***
situation 3 -0.457 -0.461 -0.663 -0.617
(-5.58)*** (-5.61)*** (-4.44)*** (-4.61)***
situation 4 -0.774 -0.790 -0.845 -0.802
(-7.20)*** (-10.20)*** (-6.97)*** (-7.17)***
situation 5 -0.773 -0.730 -0.804 -0.778
(-5.73)*** (-7.05)*** (-5.01)*** (-5.39)***
situation 6 -0.606 -0.720 -0.388 -0.395
(-2.85)*** (-2.89)*** (-1.51) (-1.56)
lnbounced/liabilities -0.040 -0.047 -0.047 -0.038
(-3.61)*** (-4.29)*** (-2.24)** (-2.26)**
guarantees/liabilities 0.427 0.429 0.475 0.475
(8.25)*** (8.27)*** (5.30)*** (6.10)***
foreign bank=1 -0.012 -0.022 0.007 -0.003
(-0.40) (-0.86) (0.16) (-0.08)
public bank=1 0.069 0.061 0.081 0.057
(2.15)** (1.74)* (1.32) (1.11)
wholesale bank=1 0.247 0.259 0.293 0.303
(5.38)*** (5.18)*** (4.24)*** (4.75)***
bank's market share 0.029 0.032 0.032 0.035
(5.84)*** (9.09)*** (5.86)*** (7.31)***
liabilities bank/system 0.214 0.197 0.238 0.187
- (3.20)*** (2.43)** (2.27)**
no. banks -0.027 -0.031 -0.030 -0.033
(-7.28)*** (-5.45)*** (-3.92)*** (-4.70)***
no. credit lines 0.132 0.129 0.124 0.115
(6.90)*** (12.91)*** (8.00)*** (8.73)***
_cons -1.394 -1.582 -1.646 -1.523
- (-16.50)*** (-10.74)*** (-11.82)***
Number of obs 15,822 11,772 4,426 5,860
Censored obs 11,679 8,242 3,078 3,998
Uncensored obs 4,143 3,530 1,348 1,862
Wald chi2 4,186 876 380 481
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Log likelihood -8,313 -6,880 -2,629 -3,514
Estimation method Heckman sel. mod. Heckman sel. mod. Heckman sel. mod. Heckman sel. mod.
 
+
 Excludes roa=0 and balance sheets with problems.
 
++ 
Validation Criteria 1/2/3/5/7 in Appendix A.
 
+++
 Validation Criteria 1/2/3/5/7/13 in Appendix A.
Note: z-statistics in parenthesis. 1,2 and 3 asterisks indicate significance at 10%, 5% or 1%.
Unused Credit Ratio Regression Equations: Different Sub-samples
In regard to firm characteristics, the availability of credit is positively and significantly
associated with the amount of assets (lnassets ), with the sales/assets ration
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(lnsales/assets), and --in the last regression equation-- with the return on assets (roa), and it
is negatively and significantly associated with the debt-to-assets ratio (lndebt/assets). At the
main bank, a worse credit situation (situation*) is negatively and significantly associated to
less credit availability, and the same happens with bounced checks (lnbounced/liabilities).
The relationship variables show that credit availability is positively and significantly
associated with more debt concentration in the main bank (liabilities bank/system ), and with
the use of more accounts at the main bank (no. credit lines), and it is negatively and
significantly associated with the number of banks (no. banks). Finally, more collateral
(guarantees/liabilities), and having a main bank that is wholesale (wholesale bank) or large
(bank’s market share) is significantly related to more credit availability.
We want to clarify some issues related to the interpretation of these results. Petersen
and Rajan divide firm characteristics into investment opportunities, which should reduce
credit availability, and measures of cash flow, which should increase it. They admit that the
dividing line is not always clear, and the effect may be a priori ambiguous, e.g. return over
assets and sales over assets can be considered either as measures of internal cash flow, or
as measures of investment opportunities. However, these distinctions may not matter at all:
if banks see this characteristic of larger investment opportunities, they may be willing to lend
more. Indeed, as Galindo, Schiantarelli, and Weiss (2001) show, an efficient financial system
will try to channel funds to firms with more profitable investment opportunities. The proxies
they use for investment opportunities are precisely return over assets and sales over assets,
precisely the variables that Petersen and Rajan consider might reduce credit availability. As
far as these investment opportunities are common knowledge to both parts, because they
can be inferred from the accounting statements of firms, this should increase the supply of
funds coming from profit maximizing financial institutions. Hence, these arguments should
lead one to expect return over assets and sales over assets to unambiguously increase the
availability of credit, exactly what happens in our estimates.
A possible stumbling block with our conjecture is that good firms with a lot of cash
might not have unused credit lines simply because they do not need them, so they do not
apply for line of credit contracts in the first place. In this regard, large firms immediately
come to mind, since they are identified in the literature with good quality firms. By the way, it
is known that larger firms are firms that are less likely to be credit constrained (Schiantarelli,
1996). However, Table 15 with the regression equation shows that larger firms have more
unused credit lines available than small firms (large firms are also more likely to not have
zero unused credit lines, according to the selection equation in the Appendix). This happens
despite the fact that large firms in Argentina might have fewer incentives to sign loan
commitment contracts with domestic banks, because they usually need to resort less to the
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domestic financial system because of their access to cheaper credit abroad. This seems to
support our conjecture that firms that are not credit constrained have unused bank credit
available.
It remains to see if this result is robust in other datasets.  For instance, if our measure
of unused credit lines is introduced into the interest rate regressions, it is significantly and
negatively related to marginal interest rates. This is sensible if one thinks that firms that are
cut off from credit in their main bank have to go shopping to other banks that are more
expensive. However, using data from the Italian Centrale dei Rischi, which distinguishes
between banks loans granted and bank loans drawn, D’Auria, Foglia, and Marullo-Reedtz
(1999) find the opposite. The share of loans drawn is negatively related to the rate of
interest, which means that firms with less unused credit lines pay lower interest rates. A
difference between their study and ours is that we look at the interest rate in the marginal
bank, whereas they explain the interest rate at each bank, and see the effect of unused
credit lines available in that same bank. However, a priori we would also have expected a
firm to exhaust its cheaper sources of funds in a bank first, so it is hard to make sense of
their results on the cost of credit. In summary, though the proportion of unused credit lines in
total bank liabilities might be easier to replicate for a wider number of countries than the
indirect measures drawn from trade credit by Petersen and Rajan (1994), it remains to be
seen if unused bank credit turns out to be a sensible indicator of credit availability, as seems
to be the case for the firms in our sample from Argentina.
5. Implications of this study
We built a cross-section of data for October 2000 to study the variation of both the cost of
credit and the access of firms to credit. We study in particular how banks use different pieces
of private and public information to screen firms and overcome informational asymmetries in
the credit market. Some private information is transferable, like balance sheet data. Private
information generated in relationships is not. We also consider public information available in
the Central de Deudores.
We use something very specific to measure the marginal cost of credit, the interest
rate charged on marginal (most expensive) bank overdrafts. To measure access of firms to
credit, our first intention was to use percentage of authorized overdrafts effectively drawn.
The overdraft authorizations are a loan commitment contract or credit line. However, we then
came up with a more comprehensive measure, unused credit lines over total financial
system liabilities. This is obverse side of trade credit if, as Petersen and Rajan conjecture,
firms with credit in the financial system do not resort to trade credit and pay early, to get a
discount. It also has to do with the loan commitment contracts in Melnik and Plaut (1986), in
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the sense that firms that have exhausted their bank commitments have to look for more
expensive credit elsewhere.
We find that the cost of credit is smaller for a firm with a close relationship to the
marginal bank, where a close relationship is linked to a large share of credit and a large
number of accounts in the marginal bank, and to a small number of total banks. Firms with
large assets, a high sales/assets ratio, and a low debt/assets ratio pay a lower interest rate
at the margin. A good credit history (no debt arrears and no bounced checks) and collateral
also reduce the marginal interest rate. Though credit history matters, as Greene (1992)
emphasizes, it is not the only thing that matters. It does not wipe out the significance of the
relationship variables, which are extremely important.
Using the proportion of unused credit lines at the main bank as a measure of firms
that are not credit constrained, we find that a good credit situation increases the availability
of credit, and that relationships are also very important to increase the access to credit. Our
proxies for relationships might signal that banks have private information that reveals the
firm is not a lemon, but rather a good credit (otherwise, why extend the firm more credit?).
Our measure of unused credit lines is less ambiguous than traditional measures like
leverage, which may indicate financial distress rather than availability of credit. Large assets,
a high return over assets, a high sales/assets ratio, a low debt/assets ratio, a good credit
history, and collateral lead to higher credit availability.
The paper does not look at the macroeconomic determinants of credit constraints.
Economy-wide credit constraints that reflect the doubts about the government's prospects
are reflected in the baseline interest rate charged to firms. The baseline interest rate has a
premium related to the interest rate spread between Argentine government bonds and U.S.
government bonds. This spread, or country risk, was on average above 750 annual basis
points in October 2000. A result from credit constraint theory is that a high probability of
default gives financial institutions an incentive to eliminate credit lines to the borrower. Since
November 2000, the international capital market for Argentina is closed due the belief of
international investors that Argentina will default on its debt. After that, the spread has
fluctuated widely, reaching 3500 basis points in November 2001. This of course impacts on
firms, which are mostly cut off from new credit. Hence, it is convenient to explore economy-
wide determinants of credit constraints faced by firms, besides the individual determinants
stressed in this study. Our regressions do not capture this result because the estimation
process is a cross-section for October 2000, but this might be possible looking also at data
for January 2001, after international markets were closed.
This paper can help to study the implications of the law of Habeas Data, which went
into effect recently in Argentina. This law puts substantial costs on the acquisition of
24
information by lenders, limiting credit history to 5 years and limiting the access to the
database. Our study shows in particular that a good median credit situation in the Central de
Deudores eases credit restrictions. A policy that restricts disclosure may end up hurting good
firms.
References
Akerlof, G. 1970. “The market for lemons: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 113: 79-119.
Allen, F. 2001. “Do financial institutions matter?” Journal of Finance.  56: 1165-1175.
Berger, A., Klapper, L., and Udell, G. 2000. “The ability of banks to lend to informationally
opaque small businesses.” Mimeo, Federal Reserve Board.
Banco Central de la República Argentina, September 2000, Información de Entidades
Financieras.
Burdisso, T., D’Amato, L., Escudé, G., and McCandless, G. 2001. “How much do SMEs
borrow from the banking system in Argentina?” Mimeo, Banco Central de la
República Argentina.
Caballero, R. 2000. “Macroeconomic volatility in Latin America: A conceptual framework and
three case studies.” Economía. 1:31-107.
Caballero, R., and Krishnamurthy, A. 1999. “Emerging markets crises: An asset market
perspective”. Mimeo, MIT.
Claessens, S., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., and Huizinga, H. 2001. “How does foreign entry affect
domestic banking markets?”. Journal of Banking and Finance. 25: 891-911.
Cole, R. A. 1998. “The importance of relationships to the availability of credit”. Journal of
Banking and Finance. 22: 959-977.
D’Auria, C., Foglia, A., and Marullo-Reedtz, P. 1999. “Bank interest rates and credit
relationships in Italy.”  Journal of Banking and Finance. 23: 1067-1093.
Diamond, D. 1984. “Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring.” Review of Economic
Studies. 51: 393-414.
Diamond, D. 1991. “Monitoring and reputation: the choice between bank loans and directly
placed debt.” Journal of Political Economy. 99: 688-721.
Freixas, X. and Rochet, J-C. 1998. Microeconomics of Banking. Cambridge, MA, United
States: MIT Press.
Galindo, A., Schiantarelli, F., and Weiss, A. 2001. “Does financial liberalization improve the
allocation of investment? Micro evidence form developing countries”. Mimeo.
Gallego, F. and Loayza, N. 2000. “Financial Structure in Chile: Macroeconomic
Developments and Microeconomic Effects.” Mimeo, World Bank.
25
Greene, W. 1992. “A statistical model for credit scoring.” Mimeo, New York University.
Greene, W. 1997. Econometric Analysis , 3rd edition. Prentice Hall.
Hoshi, T., Kashyap, A., and Scharfstein, D. 1990. “The role of banks in reducing the costs of
financial distress in Japan.” Journal of Financial Economics. 27:67-88.
Mayer, C. 1994. “The assessment: Money and banking: theory and evidence.” Oxford
Review of Economic Policy. 10: 1-13 .
Machauer, A., and Weber, M. 2000. “Number of bank relationships: An indicator of
competition, borrower quality, or just size?” Mimeo, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-
Universität.
Melnik, A. and Plaut, S. 1986. “Loan Commitment Contracts, Terms of Lending, and Credit
Allocation.” Journal of Finance. 41: 425-435.
Nawata, K. and Nagase, N. (1996), “Estimation of sample selection bias models”,
Econometric Reviews , 15: 387-400.
Petersen, M. and Rajan, R. 1994. “The benefits of lender relationships: Evidence from small
business data.” Journal of Finance. 49: 3-37.
Schiantarelli, F. 1996. “Financial constraints and investment: Methodological issues and
international evidence.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 12: 70-89.
Sharpe, S. 1990. “Asymmetric information, bank lending and implicit contracts: A stylized
model of customer relationships.” Journal of Finance. 45: 1069-1087.
Stiglitz, J. and Weiss, A. 1981. “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information.”
American Economic Review. 71: 393-410.
Wilcox, R. 1997. Introduction to Robust Estimation and Hypothesis Testing. New York:
Academic Press.
Williamson, S. 1987. “Costly monitoring, loan contracts, and equilibrium credit rationing.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 102: 135-145.
